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Abstract We study the interdependence between campaign contributions, the candidates’
positions, and electoral outcomes. In our model, a candidate who moves away from his
firmly established position towards a more risky one generates costs for the voters. Cam-
paign contributions allow the candidates to reduce these mobility costs. We show that if do-
nations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candi-
dates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns, two equilibria emerge,
depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist can-
didate. Interest groups may finance candidates whose position is far away from their own
ideal point. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games, and may
help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.
Keywords Elections · Campaign contributions · Interest groups · Run of donors
JEL Classification C72 · D72
1 Introduction
Competitive political campaigns are still a very controversial issue. Discussions on this sub-
ject relate both to the influence of campaigns on political outcomes and to their impact on
welfare.
In this paper we propose a model of political campaigns that allows to study the inter-
dependence between campaign expenditures, candidates’ positions, and electoral outcomes.
We focus on the following, often-observed political race. At the beginning of a political
race for office, two candidates try to obtain campaign support from interest groups. They
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announce positions in a policy space that are more risky the more they differ from posi-
tions announced in the past. One candidate has a firmly established position on the left of
the political spectrum and the same holds for the other candidate on the right side. Vot-
ers are risk-averse and the candidates will try to improve communication with them during
campaigns in order to reduce location uncertainty. This, in turn, allows them to move their
political positions towards the current median position. Fund-raising is a necessary condition
for getting messages across, so candidates will attempt to obtain campaign contributions at
the beginning of the political race to gain mobility within the political spectrum. Candidates
maximize their vote shares.
We study the equilibria of this game and shed light on the role of political campaigns.
The main—and novel—insight of our analysis is that with unrestricted financing of political
campaigns, multiple equilibria and a run of interest groups emerge. Depending on the belief
which candidate will win, a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist
candidate. As a consequence, even if the candidates’ initial positions and the ideal points of
the interest groups are symmetrically distributed around the median, the political positions
chosen in equilibrium will be asymmetric, and two asymmetric constellations will emerge.
Moreover, we demonstrate that donors may support a candidate whose position is not
very close to their own ideal point in order to draw the position of the winning candidate
towards their own ideal point. Suppose, for example, that the rightist candidate wins the
election. Then, donors to the right of the winning rightist candidate give money to the left-
ist candidate, as this pushes the equilibrium position of the rightist candidate towards the
right. Donors located around the median, however, will support the winning candidate. This
counterintuitive result—in comparison with other theoretical results—could be used to draw
inferences about whether candidates for public offices are more interested in policies or in
winning elections. This will be developed in the next section.
Further, the candidates do not adopt the median position in the equilibria. However, cam-
paigns lead to a partial convergence of positions towards the preferred position of the median
voter, in comparison with the equilibrium without campaigns. Campaigns thus induce the
winning position to move closer to the median ideal position.
Finally, our analysis may also enrich the incumbent/challenger discussion. A traditional
argument suggests that incumbents are perceived with lower uncertainty than challengers,
which implies a disadvantage for challengers if voters are risk-averse (see e.g. Bernhardt
and Ingberman 1985). In our model, a risky challenger may defeat an incumbent if he is
able to organize donors appropriately, because if donors believe that the challenger will win,
a majority of donors will support him, thus confirming the donors’ expectations.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we provide empirical examples
and implications of our model. In Sect. 3, we review the literature. In Sect. 4, we outline the
model. In Sect. 5, we characterize the equilibrium when campaigns are absent. In Sect. 6, we
analyze the effects of campaigns. In Sect. 7, we examine the candidate and donor equilibria,
and we illustrate the multiplicity by an example. Subsequently, we discuss extensions of the
model and propose some final conclusions.
2 Empirical examples and implications
Our model and its results can be used in two different ways, to draw broader conclusions
and to outline empirical implications.
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Empirical examples First, there are examples that groups support candidates from the
other side of the political spectrum (see e.g. Gersbach and Liessem 2002). In the federal
elections in Germany in 1994, for instance, employer associations gave almost 20 percent
of their total campaign support funds to the left-wing Social Democrats.1 These contribu-
tion patterns indicate that interest groups may not only support their close political friends,
but also, in some cases, more distant parties. In this paper we offer an explanation for this
behavior: contributing to a party on the other side of the political spectrum will induce that
party to move closer to the ideal points of the donating interest groups.
Alternative explanations We note that there might be other reasons why interest groups
may contribute to a candidate whose platform is quite distant from their ideal point. We pro-
vide two examples. First, an interest group may contribute to the funding of such a candidate
because he is the incumbent, and the interest group wants to gain his favor. Second, when a
candidate is likely to win, an interest group may support his campaign to have access to him
after the election. In the latter case, however, the interest groups may support a candidate
by money and by voting because otherwise, the money spent may be useless. The explana-
tion advanced in this paper may be particularly pertinent when interest groups support one
candidate’s campaign with money, while voting for the opponent.
Indirect test of politicians’ objectives The results of this paper are a set of testable propo-
sitions pertaining to the relationships among a set of endogenous variables (candidates’
policies, contribution decisions, amount of contributions, electoral outcomes, etc.) and a set
of exogenous variables (incumbency advantage, distribution of voters and donors).
One of our predictions is that interest groups contribute to the candidate on the other side
of the political spectrum. This counterintuitive prediction can be used to test the objectives
of politicians indirectly. The logic is as follows.
There is sufficient empirical evidence that in most cases, ideological interest groups sup-
port the political party that is closer to their own ideology (see the earlier survey of Potters
and Sloof 1996 and Stratmann 2005). Taking these empirical results as a guideline, we can
compare the results in our paper with the results in Gersbach (1998). Specifically, we have
assumed in the current paper that candidates only care about winning the election, and have
no policy preferences.
Suppose instead that candidates do have policy preferences. As shown in Gersbach
(1998), this produces a very different distribution of campaign expenditures across winners
and losers—which is much more in line with the empirical evidence discussed in Potters
and Sloof (1996)—, as only the interest groups of the center might switch between the can-
didates. Interest groups that have stronger ideological preferences always support the candi-
date whose platform is closest. The huge differences between the campaign patterns and the
empirical evidence infer that the candidates have strong policy preferences, as this generates
a campaign contribution pattern that is consistent with the empirical evidence mentioned
above.
3 Relation to the literature
Three types of advertising have been proposed for political campaigns. The first type is
directly informative advertising (see Austen-Smith 1987). Voters observe candidates’ posi-
1That interest groups also donate funds to another party than the one they are primarily supporting was
documented, e.g., in Brunell (2005).
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tions with noise, and campaign expenditures reduce the variance of that noise. Building on
this assumption, Gersbach (1998) has developed a model of campaigns in which the con-
tributions help candidates to get elected because risk-averse voters prefer candidates with
a more precise policy position. Informative campaigning in the sense of truthful revelation
about policy platforms is important when redistributive policies are considered, as shown
by Schultz (2007). He develops an interesting model in which parties target campaigns on
groups where most votes are gained by informing about policies. As a consequence, targeted
groups will become more informed, and benefit most from redistribution.
The second type is non-directly informative advertising (see e.g. Gerber 1996; Potters
et al. 1997; Gersbach 2004, and Prat 2002). Each candidate is characterized by a non-policy
dimension (valence) that lobbies can observe more precisely than voters. The amount of
campaign money a candidate collects signals his valence to voters. Hence the role of cam-
paign advertising is not to convey a direct message but to credibly “burn” campaign money.2
Coate (2004a, 2004b) and Ashworth (2006) have further developed the signaling approach
and assume that candidates send messages to voters. These costly messages may be equiva-
lent to money burning but may also consist of verifiable information as regards the character-
istics of candidates. This approach was generalized by Vanberg (2008) to two-dimensional
candidate types.
The third type is persuasive advertising (see Baron 1994; McKelvey and Ordeshook
1987; Grossman and Helpman 1996, and Ortuno Ortin and Schultz 2005). Voters are either
“informed”, “uninformed” or “impressionable”. The informed electorate votes according to
the policies proposed by the different political parties (or candidates). Impressionable voters
are, however, poorly informed as regards the policies of the different parties, and their vote
is directly influenced by campaign spending.3
We assume that the candidates can use funds to increase the share of voters supporting
them. This can be interpreted as informative advertising, where candidates use money to
reduce (risk-averse) voters’ uncertainty about their policy positions. We will give a precise
meaning of these approaches in Sect. 6. We allow that candidates’ ability to affect voting by
campaign expenditures can differ. In contrast to Gersbach (1998), who focuses on candidates
with policy preferences, we assume that candidates maximize their votes.
While we perform our analysis in the framework with risk-averse voters where cam-
paigns reduce uncertainty, it is important that the same results could be obtained in a variant
of the framework suggested by Baron (1994), where voters are either informed as regards
the parties’ and candidates’ intentions or not, and advertising is persuasive. The closer the
ideal point of an uninformed voter is to the historical position of the candidate, the more
such a voter reacts to campaigns. Therefore, a higher amount of money enables candidates
to increase the share of voters for a given position.
One of our central results is that interest group donations move the political outcome
towards the median voter. The reason is that donors behave strategically. If a majority of in-
terest groups expects that a candidate will win, the candidate obtains the majority of interest
2A different way of modeling campaign expenditures is in Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) and Austen-
Smith (1995). In their work, lobbies make contributions in exchange for access to politicians. Politicians care
about the information that lobbies can provide them with. The extent of truthful information transmission
increases in the preference congruence between a lobby and the politician (see Crawford and Sobel 1982).
Campaign contributions signal preference congruence and induce candidates to grant access to the lobbying
groups.
3This type of campaign is similar to the persuasive advertising analyzed in the economic literature. See, for
example, Shy (1995).
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group donations, allowing him to move towards the center, confirming the expectations of
the interest groups. This, in turn, makes the candidate attractive for a majority of voters,
which confirms the assumptions of the interest groups. This insight is complementary to
the work of Wittman (2007 and 2008). Wittman (2008), for instance, highlighted the impor-
tance of allowing uninformed voters to have counterstrategies when advertising is directed
towards other voters. When those uninformed voters who do not receive targeted campaign
advertising respond optimally, any negative effect of pressure groups and political advertis-
ing is mitigated, and the political outcome moves towards the median voter.
4 The model
Electoral processes exhibit many features, but often, they can be described in four stages,
which include political advertising. The time pattern can be described as follows:
Stage 1: Candidates attempt to obtain campaign support from politically active groups.
Donors spend their money to enhance the expected utilities arising for them from elec-
tion.
Stage 2: In the political strategy space, candidates choose positions that will remain fixed
during the entire electoral contest.4 The positions are determined so as to maximize the
share of voters. The voters are only imperfectly aware of the position choice of the candi-
dates.
Stage 3: Candidates use their financial support to reduce the voters’ uncertainty about their
position.
Stage 4: Individuals cast their votes, and the electoral outcome is determined by majority
voting.
In comparison to the model of Gersbach (1998), two basic assumptions are modified: (a)
parties are vote-maximizing instead of policy-motivated; (b) the uncertainty on the location
of the parties is not only decreasing in campaign spending, but also increasing in the dis-
tance to the parties’ well-known ideological positions. The properties of the equilibria differ
significantly due to these assumptions.
Formally, we assume that voters view two candidates (or parties) b and c as being located
somewhere on a unidimensional political space X = [−A,A] with A > 0.
The single-peaked utility function of voter i is given by
ui(w) = di − (w − xi)2 (1)
where di > 0 represents the maximum utility obtainable by i and xi his own most-preferred
point on the policy space X. The variable w denotes the policies a candidate pursues in office
as perceived by voters, and is either wb or wc . There is a continuum of voters represented by
the continuous density function g(xi) and distribution function G(xi). The median voter is
denoted by m and the ideal point of the median voter is normalized to xm = 0. No assumption
is needed regarding the mean position of voters.
The position choices of the candidates in stage 2 are denoted by xb and xc . Voters perceive
the announcements of positions by candidates as a noisy signal about their true position
4We assume here that campaign positions commit the candidates to policies they will pursue once they are in
office. This assumption is critical and is a core issue of the theory of political contracts outlined in Gersbach
(2012).
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and hence about the policies a winning candidate would pursue in office. These signals
are denoted by wb and wc , and differ, from the voters’ point of view, from the initially
announced positions xb and xc by random variables zb and zc , wb = xb +zb and wc = xc +zc
with E(zb) = E(zc) = 0, where E denotes the expectation operator.
We allow the variance of the signal to depend on the position of the candidate. Parties or
candidates are often perceived via some form of ideological label. Accordingly, we assume
that there exists one location for each candidate where he has an absolute advantage con-
cerning the certainty of his position as perceived by voters. If candidates move away from
their established position, they will progressively lose this advantage, and the voters will
have much greater difficulty to predict what candidates will do in office.
We use V b and V c to denote the variances of wb and wc , respectively. The dependence
on the effective position of the candidates is given by
V b = fb + kb|xb − xˆb|,
V c = fc + kc|xc − xˆc|, (2)
fb, fc, kb, kc > 0.
xˆb and xˆc denote the most firmly-established position of the candidates, that is, the location
they are perceived to occupy with the lowest uncertainty. The variables fb and fc represent
irreducible uncertainty, which we will henceforth call “floor uncertainty”. kb and kc rep-
resent the mobility costs. Thus, if a candidate diverges from his established point, he will
generate greater uncertainty the higher his mobility cost kb or kc is. Since voters are assumed
to be risk-averse, this makes spatial movements costly to vote-maximizing candidates. We
allow that the variables fb, fc and kb, kc differ across candidates.5
We assume that xˆb < xm = 0 < xˆc . This implies that we have a leftist and a rightist
candidate, as in most two-candidate elections. xm is the ideal point of the median voter.
Moreover, we focus on parameter constellations for which xb < xc will hold in equilibrium.
We assume that xb < xc , momentarily.
As to the magnitudes of kb and kc , an important remark is in order. Suppose, for instance,
that a conservative candidate moves to the right, starting from a position xc . Then, it is a
plausible requirement that the probability of the candidate’s being left to a position, say x˜c ,
with x˜c ≤ xc , has to decline. Otherwise, the probability that he is at the center, or even a left-
wing politician, would increase. This puts an upper bound on kb and kc . If kc is not too large,
for instance, a move to the right, starting from a given level xc , will lower the probability
that the candidate’s position is to the left of x˜c with x˜c ≤ xc . The precise value of this upper
bound on kc and kb depends on the distribution of zc and zb .6
Throughout this paper, we will assume that kb and kc are below the upper bounds, such
that, e.g., the probability that a conservative candidate is at the center declines when he
moves to the right.
Given the position choices xb and xc and the associated signals wb and wc , voters derive
the expected utility. The expected policies are xb and xc . From (1) we obtain
E
[
ui(wb)
] = di − (xb − xi)2 − V b,
E
[
ui(wc)
] = di − (xc − xi)2 − V c.
(3)
5If candidate b was in office in the last term, for instance, fb will be typically smaller than fc .
6Examples for the normal distribution are available upon request.
Public Choice (2014) 161:31–49 37
Voter i will prefer b to c if and only if E[ui(wb)] > E[ui(wc)], which is equivalent to
xi <
xc + xb
2
+ V
c − V b
2(xc − xb) . (4)
Therefore, voter i will cast his vote for candidate b if and only if (4) holds.
5 Candidate equilibrium without campaigns
We now deduce the equilibrium without advertising, which is called a “candidate equilib-
rium”. The candidates maximize their votes. We define the position of the voter who is
indifferent to the two candidates’ positions as
x indi =
xc + xb
2
+ V
c − V b
2(xc − xb) . (5)
All voters with xi < x indi will support candidate b and voters with xi > x indi cast their vote for
candidate c. The voter xi = x indi is indifferent between the two candidates. As he has measure
zero, his voting decision is irrelevant for the outcome. Vote-share maximization requires that
the goals of the candidates are maxx indi (candidate b) and minx indi (candidate c).
In order to derive a candidate equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium of the candidates’ plat-
form choices, we assume interior solutions, i.e. the platform choices satisfy xˆb < xb and
xˆc > xc . Precise conditions for interior solutions will be given at the end of this section.
The first-order condition for the choice xc , given some position xb , requires that
∂x indi
∂xc
= 0. (6)
By calculation of the corresponding first-order condition for candidate b, we obtain (see
Appendix 1):7
Proposition 1 In a candidate equilibrium with interior solutions, candidates choose the
following platforms:
xc = fc − fb + kbxˆb + kcxˆc +
1
4 (kb + kc)2
kb + kc , (7)
xb = fc − fb + kbxˆb + kcxˆc −
1
4 (kb + kc)2
kb + kc (8)
and
xc = 12 (kc + kb) + xb. (9)
Hence, mobility costs kc and kb are the only relevant parameters that cause candidates to
adopt different platforms. We note that the candidates choose different positions despite the
single-peakedness of the voters’ utility functions. This result is caused by the fact that there
7One can show that the second-order conditions are satisfied.
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is an incentive to deviate from a common position, e.g. the median position. It is true that
a spatial movement toward more extreme positions will attract fewer voters because of the
distance effect. But by approaching his established position, a candidate reduces uncertainty
and gains in reputation. This will outweigh the distance effect if the candidates are very
close.
If the candidates quickly lose clarity by leaving established positions (i.e. if kc and kb are
high), the candidates will be located very separately in equilibrium. If fb = fc , xˆb = −xˆc
and kc = kb , we will arrive at xc = 14 (kb + kc) and xb = − 14 (kb + kc), and thus, candidates
are located symmetrically around the median. Moreover, we obtain:
Corollary 1 Suppose fb = fc , xˆb = −xˆc . Then
lim
kb→0,kc→0
xb = lim
kb→0,kc→0
xc = 0.
Hence, for very small values of kb and kc and symmetric locations with identical floor
uncertainties, we approach the classical median voter result.
Finally, we spell out the conditions under which this equilibrium holds. We have assumed
interior solutions, i.e. xˆb < xb and xc < xˆc . From (8), the condition xˆb < xb yields8
fc − fb + kc(xˆc − xˆb) − 14 (kb + kc)
2 > 0. (10)
Analogously, using (7), the condition xc < xˆc can be rewritten as
fc − fb + kb(xˆb − xˆc) + 14 (kb + kc)
2 < 0. (11)
Next, we turn to the investigation of campaigns. We assume throughout this paper that
xˆb < xb and xc < xˆc . Essentially, this requires some minimal political polarization in com-
parison to mobility costs. That is, xˆc − xˆb must be sufficiently large relative to kb + kc and
|fc − fb|. We also recall that we have assumed that kb and kc are sufficiently small.
6 Campaigns and political outcomes
In our model, campaigns can reduce the variances V b and V c and thus the mobility costs
of candidates. To characterize the contributions of donors, we first have to investigate how
exogenous changes in mobility costs affect the candidate equilibrium. Accordingly, we focus
on the political outcome arising from a reduction of mobility costs.9
We begin by examining how a reduction of kc affects the candidate equilibrium. If can-
didate c can reduce the uncertainty surrounding his position, kc will be lowered in the third
stage. Thus, we obtain a new candidate equilibrium with the same characteristics as in (7),
(8), and (9), but now featuring new parameters.
8We note that it is possible that xb > 0 or xc < 0, and thus both parties may be located on the same side of
the political spectrum. In the following, however, we will focus on constellations xb < 0 < xc . As shown in
Proposition 1, it is always guaranteed that xc > xb .
9We note that the reduction of uncertainty can occur in two ways. First, the floor uncertainty represented by
the constants fb and fc can be reduced. Second, the direct mobility costs can be diminished. Both possibilities
lead to greater mobility for the candidates and produce qualitatively the same result.
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From the candidate equilibrium derived in the last section, we deduce in Appendix 2:
∂xb
∂kc
= kb(xˆc − xˆb) − fc + fb −
1
4 (kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2 . (12)
Using condition (11), (12) implies10
∂xb
∂kc
> 0. (13)
From (9) we obtain
∂xc
∂kc
= 1
2
+ ∂xb
∂kc
> 0. (14)
Moreover, it will also be shown in Appendix 2 that
∂x ind
∂kc
> 0. (15)
Thus, if candidate c can reduce mobility costs, we will have a new candidate equilibrium in
which c will be closer to the median because his increased mobility allows him to gain more
voters by approaching the median voter position. In general, candidate b will then be forced
to take a more extreme position.
Similarly, we will obtain symmetrical results if candidate b is able to inform the elec-
torate more efficiently. Now we need to investigate the candidate equilibrium in the case of
a reduction of kb . Again, the formal details are to be found in Appendix 2:
∂xc
∂kb
= kc(xˆb − xˆc) − fc + fb +
1
4 (kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2 . (16)
Using condition (10), (16) implies
∂xc
∂kb
< 0. (17)
Additionally, we obtain11
∂xb
∂kb
= ∂xc
∂kb
− 1
2
< 0 and
∂x ind
∂kb
< 0. (18)
Hence, if candidate b can improve communication, his position will be drawn toward the
center, and he will win more votes. Thus, every candidate has a strong incentive to reduce
the uncertainty of his position as perceived by the voters.12
10We also note that ∂xc
∂fc
= ∂xb
∂fc
> 0.
11Similarly, ∂xb
∂fb
= ∂xc
∂fb
< 0.
12This incentive contrasts with insights from other political competition models in which there may be a
preference for ambiguity when candidates are uncertain about the policy positions preferred by the median
voter. This argument was developed in an intriguing model by Glazer (1990).
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7 Donor and candidate equilibrium
7.1 The donor game
We next examine the incentives of donor groups to contribute in the first stage of the electoral
game. We assume that there is a finite number N (N > 2) of donor groups, with ideal
points characterized by the preferred point of a typical group member. Let xj (j = 1, . . . , N )
denote the corresponding ideal points. We assume that interest groups are ordered according
to their ideal points, i.e. x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xN .
We denote by Ej interest group j ’s budget for candidate support. We use Ejb (resp.
Ejc) to denote the support that candidate b (resp. c) receives from group j . Therefore,
Ejb + Ejc = Ej . A donor will spend money on the candidate in order to minimize the
distance between his ideal point and the political outcome.
The impact of campaigns can be characterized by two mobility cost or campaign func-
tions that depend solely on the aggregate support levels received by each candidate:
kc
( N∑
j=1
Ejc
)
and kb
( N∑
j=1
Ejb
)
. (19)
The first derivatives k′c and k′b are negative because the more campaign support a candidate
receives, the more uncertainty he is able to reduce.
We assume that donors are fully informed as regards the candidates’ planned policies.
Thus, they observe xb and xc . Accordingly, the donor group will support b if and only if the
support of b leads to a political outcome that is closer to the preferred point than the one
arising from support for candidate c.
7.2 The value of campaign contributions
We next determine the value of campaign contributions for an individual donor when he sup-
ports either candidate b or c. For this purpose, we consider four cases. First, we assume that
candidate b wins the election with or without the contribution of a donor j , given the contri-
butions of the other donors. The value of campaigns for an individual donor j in this case is
denoted by Uj(b)13 and calculated as the difference between the utility arising from sup-
port of b and the one arising from support of c, given the decision of the other donors. Thus,
Uj(b) = uj
(
x ′b
) − uj (xb)
= dj −
(
x ′b − xj
)2 − (dj − (xb − xj )2
)
= x2b − x ′b2 + 2xj
(
x ′b − xb
)
= (x ′b − xb
)(−xb − x ′b + 2xj
)
. (20)
If donor j supports candidate b (resp. c), x ′b (resp. xb) will be the political outcome. From
the previous section, we know that x ′b > xb . Thus, Uj(b) is monotonically increasing with
xj , and Uj(b) becomes zero for xj = x
′
b
+xb
2 . Hence, we conclude that all donors with an
ideal point greater than x
′
b
+xb
2 will support candidate b in such a case.
13The variable b indicates that candidate b wins the election in every case.
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Second, the situation is completely analogous if given the contributions of the other
donors, candidate c wins the election with support (position x ′c) and without support (po-
sition xc) of donor j . The value of campaigns for donor j is then given by
Uj(c) = uj
(
x ′c
) − uj (xc)
= dj −
(
x ′c − xj
)2 − (dj − (xc − xj )2
)
= x2c − x ′c2 + 2xj
(
x ′c − xc
)
= (xc − x ′c
)(
xc + x ′c − 2xj
)
. (21)
From inequality (14) we know that x ′c will be smaller than xc . All donors with most-preferred
points lower than x
′
c+xc
2 will select candidate c over b for campaign support.
The third and fourth cases concern scenarios where a single donor can affect the political
outcome. These cases will be discussed later.
7.3 Existence of equilibria
We finally establish the existence of candidate and donor equilibria, which we call “CD-
equilibria” in the remainder of the paper. Such an equilibrium is defined as follows.
Definition 1 A CD-equilibrium consists of positions {xb, xc}, donor decisions {Ejc}Nj=1 and
{Ejb}Nj=1, and voter decisions such that these strategies constitute a subgame perfect equi-
librium of the four-stage game.
We will focus on two types of CD-equilibria. In the first CD-equilibrium, candidate b
wins and in the second CD-equilibrium, candidate c wins.
7.3.1 Candidate b wins
We start with the circumstances in which candidate b wins the election. We define two
critical candidate positions. It will turn out that they characterize the CD-equilibrium. We
have
x∗b =
fc − fb + k∗b xˆb + k∗c xˆc − (k
∗
b
+k∗c )2
4
k∗b + k∗c
, (22)
x∗c =
fc − fb + k∗b xˆb + k∗c xˆc + (k
∗
b
+k∗c )2
4
k∗b + k∗c
(23)
with
k∗b := k∗b
(
x∗b
) := kb
( ∑
j∈{j |xj >x∗b }
Ej
)
, k∗c := k∗c
(
x∗b
) := kc
( ∑
j∈{j |xj <x∗b }
Ej
)
. (24)
Equations (24) define two values for k∗b and k∗c that are realized if all donors to the right of
x∗b support candidate b and all donors to the left of x∗b support candidate c. Definitions (24),
viewed as functions of x∗b , define two step-functions k∗b(x∗b ) and k∗c (x∗b ), where k∗b(x∗b ) is
monotonically increasing in x∗b while k∗c (x∗b ) is monotonically decreasing in x∗b . We extend
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the step-functions k∗b(x∗b ) and k∗c (x∗b ) to correspondences by including the vertical connec-
tions between two steps.
Equation (22) (with k∗b (x∗b ) and k∗c (x∗b ) from (24)) defines an implicit function for the
determination of x∗b . We show that there exists a unique value x∗b that solves (22). We con-
sider the left-hand and the right-hand side of (22) separately. The left-hand side of (22) is
trivially strictly increasing with x∗b , as it is equal to x∗b . We next show that the right-hand
side is monotonically decreasing with x∗b . This follows from the properties of k∗b(x∗b ) and
k∗c (x
∗
b ), and from the fact that the lower k∗c (or the higher k∗b ), the lower the right-hand side.
Moreover, for x∗b = −A, the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side, as all contrib-
utors support candidate b. For x∗b = 0, we assume that the right-hand side is smaller than the
left-hand side.14 Then, the value x∗b that solves (22) exists and is uniquely determined. The
arguments are similar for x∗c .
We obtain two different cases for the intersection of the left-hand side of (22) with the
right-hand side.
In the first case, x∗b is exactly the ideal point of a donor whose contributions are not
included in the campaign functions kb and kc yet. As this donor is totally satisfied with the
CD-equilibrium, we assume that he splits his contributions among the candidates to ensure
that the CD-equilibrium is not disrupted by his contribution. In the second case, x∗b does not
coincide with any ideal point of a donor. Then, by our definition of k∗b and k∗c , every donor
supports one candidate only.
x∗b and x∗c characterize a situation in which candidate b receives campaign contributions
from all donors with an ideal point greater than x∗b , whereas candidate c will only be sup-
ported by the rest of the donors.
We next establish
Proposition 2 Suppose that x ind = x∗c +x∗b2 + V
c∗−V b∗
2(x∗c −x∗b ) > 0 and that x
ind remains positive if
one donor changes his contribution decision.15 Then x∗b and x∗c constitute a CD-equilibrium.
Candidate b wins the election, and the political outcome is x∗b .
The assumptions of Proposition 2 can be expressed by the exogenous parameters of the
model. We provide a specific example in Sect. 7.4.
Proof of Proposition 2 For x∗b and x∗c to be equilibrium values, we have to show that no
donor has an incentive to deviate. If a donor with xj < x∗b changes his support to candidate
b, candidate b still wins the election and the political outcome would be greater than x∗b , and
hence further away from the donors’ own preferred point. For the same reason, a donor with
xj > x
∗
b will not want to switch his support from b to c, as candidate b continues to win and
would move further away from his preferred position. Therefore, given the contributions of
the other donors, each donor will be worse off if he deviates. By construction, {x∗b , x∗c } is
also a candidate equilibrium. Hence x∗b and x∗c constitute a CD-equilibrium. The political
outcome is x∗b . 
The intuition for the equilibrium behavior of donors runs as follows: Suppose donors
expect the leftist candidate b to win the election. Then donors to the left of the winning
14The formal condition is fc−fb+k
∗
b
(0)xˆb+k∗c (0)xˆc−
(k∗
b
(0)+k∗c (0))2
4
k∗
b
(0)+k∗c (0) < 0.
15Sufficient conditions can be given in terms of the primitives of the model.
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leftist candidate will give money to the rightist candidate, as this pushes the equilibrium
position of the leftist candidate towards the left. Donors located to the right of the winning
position will support the winner, as this draws his position to the right.
7.3.2 Candidate c wins
In this section we construct a CD-equilibrium in which candidate c wins. We define
x∗∗b =
fc − fb + k∗∗b xˆb + k∗∗c xˆc − (k
∗∗
b
+k∗∗c )2
4
k∗∗b + k∗∗c
, (25)
x∗∗c =
fc − fb + k∗∗b xˆb + k∗∗c xˆc + (k
∗∗
b
+k∗∗c )2
4
k∗∗b + k∗∗c
, (26)
k∗∗b := k∗∗b
(
x∗∗c
) = kb
( ∑
j∈{j |xj >x∗∗c }
Ej
)
, k∗∗c := k∗∗c
(
x∗∗c
) = kc
( ∑
j∈{j |xj <x∗∗c }
Ej
)
.
Again, as in the last subsection, the construction ensures that x∗∗c and x∗∗b exist and are
unique. We obtain
Proposition 3 Suppose that x ind = x∗∗c +x∗∗b2 + V
c∗∗−V b∗∗
2(x∗∗c −x∗∗b ) < 0 and that x
ind remains negative if
one donor changes his contribution decision. Then x∗∗b and x∗∗c constitute a CD-equilibrium.
Candidate c wins the election and the political outcome is x∗∗c .
The proof of Proposition 3 follows the same lines as the one of Proposition 2.
7.3.3 Summary
The characteristics of the equilibria are summarized in the following figure, which represents
the donors’ ideal points, the median voter and the choices of candidates and donors in the
CD-equilibria.
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7.4 An example
We illustrate the multiplicity of equilibria by an example. Suppose the ideal points of voters
are uniformly distributed on [−A,A]. The candidates’ established positions xˆb and xˆc are
located symmetrically around the median voter xm = 0, with xˆb = xm −  and xˆc = xm +
 for some  > 0. Candidates are associated with the same floor level of uncertainty if
they depart from their established position, i.e. fb = fc = f . Moreover, they have the same
campaign functions:
kc
(∑
Ejc
)
= k¯ − λ
∑
Ejc, (27)
kb
(∑
Ejb
)
= k¯ − λ
∑
Ejb, (28)
with some parameter λ (λ > 0). For simplicity, all contributors are located at the median
position, i.e. xj = xm,∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. The aggregate amount of campaign expenditures is
denoted by E¯ = ∑Nj=1 Ej . We assume k¯ − λE¯ > 0. Then, we obtain
Proposition 4 There exist two CD-equilibria.
(i) In one CD-equilibrium, all donors support candidate b. Candidate b wins and the plat-
forms are
x∗b =
λE¯ − (2k¯−λE¯)24
2k¯ − λE¯ , (29)
x∗c =
λE¯ + (2k¯−λE¯)24
2k¯ − λE¯ . (30)
(ii) In the other CD-equilibrium, all donors support candidate c. Candidate c wins and the
platforms are
x∗∗b =
−λE¯ − (2k¯−λE¯)24
2k¯ − λE¯ , (31)
x∗∗c =
−λE¯ + (2k¯−λE¯)24
2k¯ − λE¯ . (32)
The example illustrates how two CD-equilibria emerge. Donors either run to the support
of candidate b, ensuring that he wins, or they jointly secure the winning of candidate c. In
both cases, the support decisions of donors are best responses.
7.5 Discussion of the assumptions and uniqueness
Before we consider further features of these equilibria, we shall first discuss the assumptions
of Propositions 2 and 3 and the uniqueness issue. It is easy to demonstrate that under the
assumptions of the last section, the derived equilibria are unique. Uniqueness is shown in two
steps. Let us first consider the decisions of contributors. Suppose, for instance, a potential
CD-equilibrium, say xb and xc , in which candidate b wins the election. If any donor with
an ideal point lower than xb supports candidate b, he can increase his utility by supporting
c, which drives the political outcome toward his ideal point. Similarly, a donor with xj > xb
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can do no better than to support candidate b to reduce the distance between the political
outcome and his preferred point.
Second, suppose there exist two equilibria in which candidate b wins, but the political
platforms differ. Suppose the possible equilibrium positions of candidate b are x∗1b and x∗2b ,
with x∗2b > x∗1b . Then, in the equilibrium with x∗2b , candidate b would obtain a smaller share
of contributors compared to x∗1b , as he is supported by interest groups to the right. However,
with x∗2b , he is further away from his established position, which would require a larger share
of contributors to reduce mobility. This is a contradiction and thus, there can exist only one
equilibrium in which candidate b wins.
To sum up, under the assumptions of Propositions 2 and 3, the derived equilibria are
unique.
Next, we discuss what happens if one assumption does not hold.
First, we have assumed that the positions x∗b and x∗∗c will gain a majority of voters, respec-
tively. If this condition is not fulfilled, we will have only one CD-equilibrium. The reason
is as follows: suppose, for instance, that candidate b gains no majority with x∗b , as x∗∗b < x∗b
and x∗∗c < x∗c . Candidate c is certain of winning the election in the situation (x∗∗b , x∗∗c ), as he
gains even more votes. Therefore we have at least one CD-equilibrium.
The second condition assumed in the last section states that given the constellation
(x∗b , x
∗
c ) or (x
∗∗
b , x
∗∗
c ), no donor can change the political outcome by changing his decision.
Suppose, e.g., that in a CD-equilibrium characterized by x∗b and x∗c , a donor with xj > x∗c
can ensure that candidate c will win the election with his donations. Then, of course, he will
select candidate c over b. Hence, in this case, (x∗b , x∗c ) cannot be a candidate equilibrium.
Thus, in general, if a donor is pivotal in a candidate equilibrium, he has an interest in chang-
ing the winning platform, and the equilibrium will not be a donor equilibrium. But again, if
for instance, in (x∗b , x∗c ), the majority of voters in favor of candidate b is very small, which
will enable one donor to change the political outcome, the CD-equilibrium with (x∗∗b , x∗∗c ),
will in general imply a substantial majority for candidate c. So, as a rule in this case we
again expect one CD-equilibrium to hold if we have enough donors.16
7.6 Implications
The derived CD-equilibria have some remarkable consequences. We now discuss several
important features of the case when all assumptions hold and both CD-equilibria exist.
Both candidates have a chance of winning the election that depends on the realization of
the CD-equilibrium. Moreover, some donor groups will support a candidate whose position
is not closest to their own ideal point. In a CD-equilibrium with (x∗b , x∗c ), on the other hand,
donors with xj < x∗b will support candidate c, whereas a donor with xj = x∗c will contribute
to funding of candidate b’s campaign. In any case, however, donors located around the
median will support the winning candidate. If the median donor coincides with the median
voter, the median donor will always contribute to the candidate whose position is closest to
his.
Campaign support that increases the mobility of both candidates leads to a convergence
of the candidates’ positions in the CD-equilibrium since
16Precise conditions can be given when distributions of voters and donors are specified.
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xc = kc + kb2 + xb,
and kc and kb decrease due to advertising.17
This convergence does not end at the median or in equal locations, but the positions with
campaigns are closer than those without campaigns.
Moreover, symmetrical political and support constellations yield asymmetrical out-
comes. Suppose prospective campaign funds are symmetrically distributed around the me-
dian position, and xˆc = −xˆb , fc = fb , and kc = kb without campaigns. Then, in a CD-
equilibrium, the candidates do not take up symmetrical positions. By contrast, in equilib-
rium, one candidate will attract the majority of donors and win despite the fact that both
candidates are equally attractive at the outset.
A property of the equilibria is that small differences in candidate positions without cam-
paigns do not destroy the incentives for donors to contribute, because a reduction of uncer-
tainty affects the equilibrium positions independently of their distance. Political controversy
is not a necessary condition for fundraising, which adds an important twist to the literature
(e.g. Congleton 1989).
The increase of mobility by campaigns does not necessarily imply that voters perceive
lower uncertainty in equilibrium. Let us consider a constellation in which candidate b is
located in his established point xˆb without campaigns and wins the election. In the CD-
equilibrium in which b wins, voters will perceive higher uncertainty, since b is drawn
toward the center, which is associated with higher uncertainty compared to the outcome
without campaigns. Thus campaigns that reduce mobility costs can raise uncertainty in a
CD-equilibrium.
It has been argued that consistent incumbents are perceived as a lottery with smaller vari-
ance than any challenger (e.g. Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985 and Anderson and Glomm
1992). This fact can be easily incorporated into our framework. Suppose candidate c is the
incumbent. We assume that xˆc = −xˆb , fc < fb , and kc < kb without any campaign support.
Then the incumbent will win the election without campaigns, since (5), (7), and (8) imply
that x indi < 0 = xm. But our model shows that despite this initial advantage, there may be a
CD-equilibrium in which the challenger will win the election if he attracts the major part
of the donors. This suggests another way of looking at incumbent/challenger competition,
which is characterized by the difficulty of defeating the incumbent. If and only if the chal-
lenger is able to organize donor support much better than the incumbent, will he be able
to defeat the incumbent. Hence, the electoral advantage for the incumbent can suddenly be
outweighed by a new organization of donors by the challenger.
8 Concluding remarks
We have examined a simple model of campaigns in which contributors support candidates,
who can then engage in more costly campaigning. We have argued that campaigns may
induce a run by a number of interest groups to support one candidate.
The model presented in this paper can be extended in several directions. It could be
complemented by other aspects of political campaigning, such as an exchange of money
for services or for access to an officeholder. This would tend to strengthen the incentives of
interest groups to support the winning candidate, and would reinforce the run phenomenon.
17This will not be true if the uncertainty floors of b and c are lowered by campaigns, because in that case, the
distance between candidate b and candidate c remains unchanged.
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The results in this paper constitute a set of testable propositions pertaining to the relation-
ships between a set of endogenous variables (candidates’ policies, contribution decisions,
amount of contributions, electoral outcomes) and a set of exogenous variables (incumbency
advantage, distribution of voters and donors). In particular, we have assumed that candidates
only care about maximizing their votes. If we assumed that candidates also have policy pref-
erences, this produces a very different distribution of campaign expenditures across winners
and losers,18 which is much more in line with the empirical evidence discussed in Potters
and Sloof (1996), as only interest groups that are in the center may switch between can-
didates. Comparing Gersbach (1998) and this paper thus constitutes a new indirect test of
politicians’ objectives.
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Appendix 1
First we deduce the candidate equilibrium from (5):
x indi =
xc + xb
2
+ V
c − V b
2(xc − xb) ,
and from the candidate goals maxx indi (candidate b) and minx indi (candidate c). Given some
position xb , the first-order condition for the choice xc is given by
∂x indi
∂xc
= 1
2
(
1 − fc − fb − kcxc + kcxˆc − kbxb + kbxˆb
(xc − xb)2 −
kc
xc − xb
)
= 0.
Similarly, the first-order condition for xb is
∂x indi
∂xb
= 1
2
(
1 + fc − fb − kcxc + kcxˆc − kbxb + kbxˆb
(xc − xb)2 −
kb
xc − xb
)
= 0.
By adding these two equations we obtain
1 − kc + kb
2(xc − xb) = 0,
which leads to
xc = 12 (kc + kb) + xb.
Thus the candidates take different positions in equilibrium, depending on the mobility costs.
We insert xc − xb = 12 (kc + kb) into the first first-order condition and obtain
1 − fc − fb + kc
1
2 (kb + kc) + kc(xˆc − xb − 12 (kb + kc)) − kb(xb − xˆb)
1
4 (kc + kb)2
= 0,
which implies
18Gersbach (1998).
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1
4
(kc + kb)2 = fc − fb − xb(kb + kc) + kcxˆc + kbxˆb.
Thus we find that
xb = fc − fb + kbxˆb + kcxˆc −
1
4 (kb + kc)2
kb + kc .
Because of xc = 12 (kc + kb) + xb we obtain
xc = fc − fb + kbxˆb + kcxˆc +
1
4 (kb + kc)2
kb + kc .
Appendix 2
We calculate the derivative of xb with respect to kc:
∂xb
∂kc
= (kb + kc)xˆc −
1
2 (kb + kc)2 − fc + fb − kbxˆb − kcxˆc + 14 (kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2
= kb(xˆc − xˆb) + fb − fc −
1
4 (kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2 .
By using ∂xc
∂kc
= 12 + ∂xb∂kc , we derive
∂x ind
∂kc
= ∂
∂kc
(
1
2
(xc + xb) + V
c − V b
2(xc − xb)
)
= 1
2
{
∂xb
∂kc
+ 1
2
+ ∂xb
∂kc
+ ∂
∂kc
(
fc + kc(xˆc − xc) − fb − kb(xb − xˆb)
xc − xb
)}
= ∂xb
∂kc
+ 1
4
+ fb − fc +
∂xb
∂kc
(−kc − kb)(kb + kc)
(kb + kc)2
+ xˆc(kb) − kbxˆb −
1
2 (kc + kb)2
(kb + kc)2
= fb − fc + kb(xˆc − xˆb) −
1
4 (kc + kb)2
(kb + kc)2 .
The last expression coincides exactly with ∂xb
∂kc
. Thus ∂xind
∂kc
= ∂xb
∂kc
> 0. Similarly, we obtain
∂xc
∂kb
= (kb + kc)xˆb +
1
2 (kb + kc)2 − fc + fb − kbxˆb − kcxˆc − 14 (kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2
= kc(xˆb − xˆc) + fb − fc +
1
4 (kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2 ,
∂x ind
∂kb
= ∂xc
∂kb
< 0.
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